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Abstract
We analyze, in this paper, a DSGE New Keynesian model with indi-
visible labor where ￿rms may belong to two di⁄erent ￿nal goods producing
sectors: one where wages and employment are determined in competitive
labor markets and the orther where wages and employment are the result
of a contractual process between unions and ￿rms. Bargaining between
￿rms and monopoly unions implies real wage rigidity in the model and,
in turn, an endogenous trade-o⁄ between output stabilization and in￿ a-
tion stabilization. We show that the negative e⁄ect of a productivity
shock on in￿ ation and the positive e⁄ect of a cost-push shock is crucially
determined by the proportion of ￿rms that belong to the competitive sec-
tor. The larger is this number, the smaller are these e⁄ects. We derive
a welfare based objective function as a second order Taylor approxima-
tion of the expected utility of the economy￿ s representative agent and we
analyze optimal monetary policy. We show that the larger is the num-
ber of ￿rms that belong to the competitive sector, the smaller should be
the response of the nominal interest rate to exogenous productivity and
cost-push shocks. If we consider, however, an instrument rule where the
interest rate must react to in￿ ationary expectations, the rule is not af-
fected by the structure of the labor market. The results of the model are
consistent with a well known empirical regularity in macroeconomics, i.e.
that employment volatility is larger than real wage volatility.
JEL codes: E24, E32, E50, J23, J51
1 Introduction
One of the most striking changes in the structure of the American and British
labor markets over the last fourty years is the decrease in the role of trade
unions. In the US, trade union membership in the private sector declined from
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137% in 1970 to 26% in 1978 and is now only 7.40%. In the UK, in 1979, the
proportion of employees who were trade union members was over 50%; today
this number is below 30% and, in the private sector, below 20%. If, instead of
union density, we consider union coverage, we ￿nd that in the US less than 15%
of workers are covered by collective contract agreements1, and in the UK less
than 36%. What are the consequences of these dramatic structural changes for
monetary policy? Should central banks operating in economies characterized by
competitive labor markets behave di⁄erently from those operating in economies
where unions play a major role?
Some recent empirical evidence, although not focused directly on this issue,
indicates for the US and the UK a considerable di⁄erence in the response of
monetary policy to productivity shocks before and after 1979. Gal￿ et al. [22]
￿nd that in the pre-Volcker period the FED responded to a positive technol-
ogy shock with a signi￿cant decrease in the nominal interest rate, while in the
Volcker-Greespan period the response was small and positive. Similarly, Francis
et al. [20] estimate that for the US the response of the nominal interest rate
to a positive technology shock was negative in both periods but larger before
1979. For the UK, the same response was negative before 1979 and smaller
and positive after 1979. Although the stance of monetary policy is certainly
the result of many possible considerations, it is quite likely that central banks,
in setting interest rates, play close attention to the evolution of labor market
conditions.
In this paper we try to shed some light on these issues by studying monetary
policy in dual labor markets. Firms may belong to two di⁄erent ￿nal-goods pro-
ducing sectors: one where wages and employment are determined under perfect
competition, and the other where wages and employment are the result of a
contractual process between unions and ￿rms. We focus on the normative as-
pect, and we investigate what monetary policy should look like in these markets.
The model provides a benchmark against which we can evaluate not only the
consequences, for monetary policy, of the structural changes in the US and the
UK labor markets, but also of the large di⁄erences that still exist between these
countries and other European countries such as Italy, France or Sweden. 2
We propose of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium New Keynesian
(DSGE-NK henceforth) where, as in Hansen [30] and Rogerson and Wright [41],
labor supply is indivisible and workers face a positive probability to remain
unemployed; as in Ma⁄ezzoli [33] and Zanetti [54], we assume that unions set
wages according to the popular monopoly-union model introduced by Dunlop
[18] and Oswald [36]. By doing this we depart from the recent literature, that
has recently analyzed search and matching frictions ￿ la Mortensen-Pissarides
1Union coverage is de￿ned as the number of workers covered by collective contracts as a
percentage of total employment. This concept is di⁄erent than the concept of union density,
i.e. the percentage of workers that belong to a union, since in many countries collective
contracts signed by unions and representative of ￿rms are binding also for non-members.
2In these countries union coverage is above 84%. More precisely, the number of persons
covered by collective agreeements over total employment was 94.5% in France in 2003, 84.1%
in Italy in the year 2000 and 85.1% in Sweden in the year 2000. For a complete set of data
on various countries see Lawrence and Ishikawa [32].
2([34])3 in DSGE-NK models and we concentrate on the consequences of collective
bargaining between unions and ￿rms. 4.
In this model union bargaining gives rise to real wage rigidity and this, as
was recently shown by Blanchard and Gal￿ [6], has very important consequences
for monetary policy. What these authors de￿ne as the ￿ divine coincidence￿does
not generally hold: for a central bank stabilizing output around the level that
would prevail under ￿ exible prices (natural output) is not equivalent to pursuing
the e¢ cient level of output and a trade-o⁄ arises between output stabilization
and in￿ ation stabilization. An important aspect of our model is that we do not
simply assume real wage rigidity as in Christo⁄el and Linzert [13] and Blan-
chard and Gal￿ [6], [7], but we derive it as a consquence of the structure of the
labor market. Another important aspect of our framework with labor indivisi-
bilities we don￿ t have the problem that is usually found when wage rigidities are
introduced in models with search and matching frictions (see for example [47])
i.e. the fact that wage rigidities apply only to new hirings and not to ongoing
relationships.
A ￿rst major result of our model is that the trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation
stabilization and the level of output (and unemployment) depends on the relative
weight of the unionized and the competitive sectors: the larger is the fraction
of ￿rms that are able to set wages in a competitive labor market, the smaller is
the trade-o⁄ they face in response to productivity shocks. This has signi￿cant
consequences for optimal monetary policy that we derive, as in Woodford [52],
from the maximization by the central bank of a second order approximation of
agents￿ utility function. Di⁄erently from the model recently proposed by Thomas
[47] where wage rigidity is the result of wage norms, in￿ ation targeting is not
optimal.
A second result is that in an economy where unions are not very important
the nominal interest rate should change much less in response to a productivity
shock than in an economy where wages are largely set by collective bargaining
between unions and ￿rms. The larger is the fraction of ￿rms that set wages in
competitive labor markets, the smaller is the e⁄ect of productivity shocks on
in￿ ation, and therefore the smaller the need to increase interest rates to prevent
an increase in the rate of in￿ ation. In our model, therefore, the behavior of
central banks is consistent with the di⁄erent volatilities of the interest rate in
the US and the UK that are found before 1979 (a period in which trade unions
still had an important role on wage determination) and after 1979 (a period in
which the role of trade unions declined drammatically).
The fact that the response of monetary policy to technology shocks should
depend on the relative weight of trade unions, however, does not mean that
central banks should behave di⁄erently in response to in￿ ationary expectations.
3Among these papers we ￿nd ChØron and Langot [11], Walsh [50] [51], Trigari [48], [49],
Moyen and Sahuc [35] and Andres et al. [2] and, more recently by Christo⁄el and Linzert [13]
and Blanchard and Gal￿ [6], [7].
4Also Christo⁄el and Linzert [13] and Blanchard and Gal￿ [6], [7] consider explicitly real
wage rigidity, but in their models real wage rigidity is simply assumed and it is not derived
as a consequences of the institutional structure that characterizes the labor market.
3In general, the Taylor principle should apply, but the more than proportional
increase of nominal interest rates with respect to in￿ ation should be independent
of the structure of labor market. Therefore, if we consider two countries hit by
the same shocks and where the central bank behaves optimally, we will observe
that in the country where the number of ￿ walrasian￿￿rms is larger the interest
rate will vary much less than in the other country. This, however, will not be
the consequence of di⁄erences in the reaction functions of the two central banks
to a unit change in expected in￿ ation; rather it will be caused by the fact that
the economy where the labor market is more competitive will experience smaller
in￿ ationary tensions.
Our model provides also a convenient framework to address important nor-
mative issues such as, for example, the optimal behavior of central banks in
periods characterized by labor market turmoil and exogenous wage shocks. In
the framework we propose here a policy trade-o⁄for the central bank arises also
in response to exogenous changes in the unions￿reservation wage, that we inter-
pret as cost push shocks. If the unions￿reservation wage is subject to exogenous
changes, and these changes tend to be persistent over time, then a welfare max-
imizing central bank must again face the problem of whether to accommodate
these shocks with a easier monetary policy. As in the case of technology shocks,
also in this case optimal monetary policy requires only partial accommodation,
and the response of the central bank is crucially determined by the fraction of
￿rms that, in the economy, set wages competitively. Since both the technology
shock and the reservation wage shock, in our model, a⁄ect the Phillips curve, we
are able to analyze optimal monetary policy when the economy is hit by these
two shocks at the same time. One last important result is that the model is able
to account for a well known stylized fact in macroeconomics, i.e. the relatively
smooth behavior of wages and the relatively volatile behavior of unemployment
over the business cycle.5
We ￿nally calibrate the model and we analyze the di⁄erences between an
economy where the central bank follows a standard Taylor rule, as the one
estimated by Smets and Wouters [53] for Europe, and an economy where the
central bank follows the optimal rule. We show that, under a Taylor rule, a
unionized economy tends to have larger responses to productivity shocks than
an economy where competitive labor markets prevail. The di⁄erence in the
impulse response function between these two types of economies becomes much
larger, however, under an optimal monetary policy. Optimality implies also
that monetary policy be much more accomodating when wages are the result of
bargaining between unions and ￿rms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop a DSGE-NK
model with indivisible labor and two-sector labor market while in Section 3 we
study optimal monetary policy. In Section 4 we discuss the calibration of the
model.
5Also Gertler and Trigari [26] propose a model where wages and unemployment move con-
sistently with the observed data. They achieve this result, however, by introducing exogenous
multiperiod wage contracts.
42 The model
2.1 The Representative Household
We consider an economy populated by many identical, in￿nitely lived worker-
households each of measure zero. Households demand a Dixit, Stiglitz [17]
composite consumption bundle produced by a continuum of monopolistically
competitive ￿rms. In each period households sell labor services to the ￿rms and
each ￿rm is endowed with a pool of households from which it can hire. As a
matter of fact ￿rms hire workers from a pool composed of in￿nitely many house-
holds so that the individual household member is again of measure zero. Since
each household supplies its labor only to one ￿rm, which can be clearly iden-
ti￿ed, workers try to extract some producer surplus by organizing themselves
into ￿rm speci￿c trade unions. As organizing a union is costly, we assume that
workers, each time, succeed in organizing a union only in 1 ￿ q ￿rms, while in
the remaining q ￿rms they do not succeed and labor markets remain competi-
tive. Given the structure of the economy, q not only represents the number of
￿rms that face a walrasian labor market but also the probability that a worker is
assigned to the walrasian sector. Once a household is assigned to a ￿rm speci￿c
sector, as in Hansen [30], Rogerson [41] and Rogerson and Wright [42], it has
the alternative between working a ￿xed number of hours and not working at all.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that q is constant.
As we show in Appendix A1, we are able to write the life-time expected






































t are respectively the probability to be employed in the wal-
rasian and in the unionized sector and Nt = qNw
t +(1 ￿ q)Nu
t is the probability
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where Wh
t (h = w;u) is the wage rate in the two sectors. Total consumption Ct
is a geometric average of consumption of the good produced in the walrasian













is the corresponding consumption price index (CPI) which is derived in Appen-
dix A3, and Pw
t and Pu
t are respectively the price index of goods produced in
the walrasian and the unionized sectors. The purchase of consumption goods, is
￿nanced by labor income, pro￿t income ￿t; and a lump-sum transfers Tt from
the Government. We assume that agents can also have access to a ￿nancial
market where nominal bonds are exchanged. We denote by Bt the holdings of
a nominal bond carried over from period t that pays one unit of currency in
period t + 1. Its price is R
￿1
t ; where Rt denotes the gross nominal yield.
In solving the maximization of (1) subject to (2) we should remember that
the worker chooses the levels of consumption Ct and Ct+1 and the supply of
labor Nw
t , while Nu
t is taken as given, as it is determined by the union together






















where equation (5) is the standard consumption Euler equation6. Equation (6)
holds only for households employed in the walrasian sector. Optimality requires
that the no-Ponzi game condition on wealth is also satis￿ed.
2.2 The Two Representative Final Goods-Producing Firms
In each sector (h = w;u) a perfectly competitive ￿nal good producer purchases
a Y h
t (j) units of each intermediate good j 2 [0;1] at a nominal price Ph
t (j) to
produce Y h



























where ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods, which
is equal for the two sectors. Pro￿t maximization yields the following set of













































6See Appendix A2 for derivation
6are the price indexes of the walrasian and unionized sectors.
2.3 The Two Representative Intermediate Goods-Producing
Firms
We abstract from capital accumulation and assume that the representative in-
termediate good-producing ￿rm j in sector h; hires Nh
t units of labor from the
household and produces Y h
t (j) units of the intermediate good using the follow-
ing technology:
Y h
t (j) = AtNh
t (j)
￿ (10)
where At is an exogenous productivity shock common to all ￿rms. We assume
that the lnAt ￿ at follows the autoregressive process
at = ￿aat￿1 + ^ at (11)
where ￿a < 1 and ^ at is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innovation
with zero mean and standard deviation ￿a. The assumption of decreasing re-
turns to scale, which is in line with a non-competitive intermediate good sector,
has important implications on the optimal price-setting rule, and then on the
derivation of the traditional Phillips curve.7
Before choosing the price of its goods, a ￿rm chooses the level of Nh
t (j)
which minimizes its total costs, obtaining the following labor demand,
￿


















t (j) represents the nominal marginal costs of ￿rm j in sector h
and where ￿h represents an employment subsidy to the sector h ￿rm, which
is set so that the steady state equilibrium in both sectors coincides with the




















For households hired by ￿rms in the unionized sector, unions negotiate wages
on behalf of their members. Since each household supplies its labor to only
one ￿rm, which can be clearly identi￿ed, workers try to extract some producer
surplus by organizing themselves into a ￿rm-speci￿c trade union. The economy
is populated by decentralized trade unions, so that each intermediate goods-
producing ￿rm negotiates with a single union i 2 (0;1) which is too small to
7In fact, as shown in Sbordone [44] and in Gal￿ et al. [25], it should be taken into account
that marginal costs are no longer common across ￿rms (see appendix A5 or).
8We assume that the subsidy is covered by a lump sum tax in that the Government runs
always a balanced budget.
7in￿ uence the outcome of the market.9 Unions negotiate the wage on behalf of
their members.
Once unions are introduced in the analysis, two important issues arise: what
is the objective function of the union and what are the variables of the bargain-
ing process. Both these questions have been extensively investigated by the
literature, although no conclusive agreement has been reached on the issue.10
The problem of identifying an appropriate maximand for the union dates back
to Dunlop [18] and Ross [43]; since then the debate has revolved over the rela-
tive importance of economic considerations (basically how employers respond to
wage bargaining) and political considerations in the determination of union wage
policy. For political considerations we intend how the preferences of workers,
the preferences of union leaders and market constraints interact in determining
a union￿ s objective.
One approach often followed in the literature is the ￿ utilitarian￿approach
pioneered by Oswald [36] which consists on assuming that all workers are equal
and that the union simply maximizes the sum of workers￿utility, de￿ned over
wages. Although simple and appealing because coherent with a standard eco-
nomic approach, this formulation of unions￿utility does not allow for political
considerations. An alternative approach, initially proposed by Dertouzos and
Pencavel [16] and Pencavel [37] and, more recently, reproposed by De la Croix
et al. [15] and Raurich and Sorolla [40], is to assume that unions maximize a



















The relative value of ￿ and & is an indicator of the relative importance of wages
and employment in the union￿ s objective function.12 The reservation wage Wr
t
is the absolute minimum wage the union can tolerate. This reservation wage
has many possible interpretations. One possible interpretation is that Wr
t is
the opportunity wage of the workers (Pencavel 1984) since it is unlikely that
a union can survive if it negotiates a wage below such level. Another possible
interpretation of Wr
t is what Blanchard and Katz [5] de￿ne an ￿ aspiration wage￿ ,
9For tractability, we consider atomistic unions and we abstract in this paper from the issue
of strategic interaction between unions and central banks, which as recently considered by
Gnocchi [?] in the context of a DSGE-NK model.
10For an extensive survey of unions model see Farber [19], and, more recently, Kaufman
[27].
11As it can be easily veri￿ed, if unions set wage to simply maximize agents￿utility, the wage
schedule would be similar to the labor supply in the indivisible labor model, with the di⁄erence
that the wage would be a constant mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution. In this case,
wages would fully respond to technology shocks and no signi￿cant trade-o⁄ between in￿ation
and unemployment (output gap) would emerge. Therefore, assuming that the union leader
has this type of objective function is a very simple and realistic way to obtain endogenous
real wage rigidities.
12The objective function we consider is closed to the one suggested by the Ross tradition.
In fact, for di⁄erent parameters values, the union￿ s objective function is almost equivalent to
the one of a union which maximizes his income or his membership, as for example in Skatun
[45] and in Booth [8].
8i.e. a wage that workers have come to regard as ￿ fair￿ . The unions￿reservation
wage is generally unobservable and therefore hard to model. As in De la Croix13










t￿1 + ^ "
w
t (16)
where $ > 0, ￿w < 1 and "w
t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated
innovation with zero mean and standard deviation ￿w. If the real reservation
wage is constant, ^ "
w
t = 0: The fact that the reservation wage is subject to
persistent shocks is meant to capture the exogenous wage shocks that have often
characterized industrialized economies, especially in Europe.14 Notice that the
Stone-Geary utility function is appealing not only for its ability to approximate
the actual behavior of unions and for its ￿ exibility and tractability, but also for
its generality. If we set for example ￿ = 1; & = 1 and ^ "
w
t = 0, maximizing (14)
is equivalent to maximize the unions￿objective function assumed by Ma⁄ezzoli
[33] and Zanetti [54] in their recent papers.
The bargaining process we consider here is in the tradition of the ￿ right to
manage￿models. In particular, we follow the popular ￿ monopoly union￿model
￿rst proposed by Dunlop [18] and Oswald [36], where the employment rate
and the wage rate are determined in a non-cooperative dynamic game between
unions and ￿rms. We restrict the attention to Markov strategies, so that in each
period unions and ￿rms solve a sequence of independent static games. Each
union behaves as a Stackelberg leader and each ￿rm as a Stackelberg follower.
Once the wage has been chosen, each ￿rm decides the employment rate along its
labor demand function. Even if unions are large at the ￿rm level, they are small
at the economy level, and therefore they take the aggregate wage as given. The
ex-ante probability of being employed is equal to the aggregate employment rate
and the allocation of union members to work or leisure is completely random and
independent over time. Finally, we assume that workers are able to perfectly
insure themselves against the possibility of being unemployed. Insurance is
supplied under a zero-pro￿t condition and is therefore actuarially fair.
Unions maximize (14) subject to the labor demand of ￿rms, (13), in sector
13In the model of De la Croix et al. [15] the real reservation wage is a weighted sum of a
constant term and of the past real wage. In order not to add further ad-hockery to the model,
we chose not to include past real wages. Nevertheless adding these to equation (15) would
leave the results unchanged. A technical appendix is avalable upon request.
14We consider both these two alternative in order to show that the our results on the
endogenous in￿ation unemployment (output) trade-o⁄ is not qualitatively in￿uenced by the
fact that the reservation wage shock is an exogenous shock. Moreover, to our knowledge this
is the ￿rst attempt to study how the optimal interest rate rule should react in response to
more than one supply shock.












Notice that the technology shock has no e⁄ect on the real wage rate chosen by
the monopoly union. Since 1
1￿￿ > 1; we see that the real wage rate is always
set above the reservation wage.
2.5 Market Clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that the production of the ￿nal good
be allocated to expenditure, as follows:
Y h
t (j) = Ch;t (j) h = w;u (18)
where Ch;t is the total consumption of the good produced by sector h: The















which given (7) imply
Yt = Ct: (20)
Equation (20) represents the aggregate economy￿ s resource constraint. Since the
net supply of bonds, in equilibrium is zero, equilibrium in the bonds market,
implies
Bt = 0: (21)
From equations (8) and (10) we have
Dw
t Y w







































are measures of price dispersion. Given the market clearing conditions and given












Since in a neighborhood of a symmetric equilibrium and up to a ￿rst order
approximation Dh
t ’ 1; the total amount of goods produced by the economy is
a geometric average of the aggregate production of the two sectors.
102.6 The First Best Level of Output
The e¢ cient level of output can be obtained by solving the problem of a benev-
olent planner that maximizes the intertemporal utility of the representative
household, subject to the resource constraint and the production function. This
problem is analyzed in the Appendix A4 where we show that the e¢ cient level
of output is given by:
y
Eff
t = at: (25)
2.7 The Two Sectors Labor Market Equilibrium
Labor market equilibrium in the walrasian sector is obtained equating labor
















From the households￿intertemporal problem (derived in Appendix A2) we have
Pw















Similarly, in the unionized sector, considering the wage schedule (14) and




















Notice that, di⁄erently from what happens in the walrasian sector, equation
(28) contains the relative price between goods produced in the walrasian and
in the unionized sectors. In the walrasian labor market the relative price does
not a⁄ect equilibrium, since movements in the relative price are corrected by
movements in the relative wage. In the unionized sector instead, because of real
wage rigidity, a change in the relative price has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on equilibrium.
Since, from the intertemporal household problem, (Appendix A2) we have
Pu


















2.8 The Flexible Price Equilibrium Output in the Wal-
rasian and in the Unionized Sectors













11Notice that real marginal costs in the walrasian sector are increasing in the out-
put of the walrasian sector and decreasing in the aggregate output. Considering
that in the ￿ exible price equilibrium we must have mcw
t = 0, from the aggregate










which implies that ￿ exible price equilibrium output in the walrasian sector is
an increasing function of the productivity shock and of the aggregate output.
Notice that when q = 1; (31) can be rewritten as y
wf
t = at; i.e., the ￿ exible
price equilibrium output coincides with the e¢ cient one.











As in the walrasian sector, real marginal costs are increasing in the output of





t = ￿yt + at ￿ ￿wr
t (33)
which implies that the ￿ exible price equilibrium output in the unionized sector
is increasing in the productivity shock and aggregate output.
Given equations (30), (31), (32) and (33), in both sectors real marginal costs













2.9 The Natural Output
We de￿ne the natural output of the economy y
f
t as the weighted sum of ￿ exi-
ble price equilibrium output of the walrasian and unionized sectors (equations





￿ ￿ q￿(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿q
at ￿
￿ (1 ￿ q)￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿q
wr
t: (35)






￿￿ (1 ￿ q)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿q
at ￿
￿ (1 ￿ q)￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿q
wr
t: (36)
What is important to notice, here, is that, unlike what happens in the walrasian
model, the di⁄erence between ￿ exible equilibrium output (natural output) and
e¢ cient equilibrium output is not constant, but is a function of the relevant
shocks that hit the economy. In this model therefore, as in Blanchard and
Gal￿ [6] stabilizing the output gap - the di⁄erence between actual and natural
output - is not equivalent to stabilizing the welfare relevant output gap - the
12gap between actual and e¢ cient output. In other words, what Blanchard and
Gal￿ call ￿ the divine coincidence￿does not hold, since any policy that brings
the economy to its natural level is not necessarily an optimal policy.
De￿ning by ￿ =
￿(1￿q)
￿(1￿￿)+￿q, the response of the welfare relevant output
gap to the relevant shocks (notice that the response to a technology shock is
identical, but with the opposit sign, to the response to a reservation wage shock),




As the number of walrasian ￿rms increases, the di⁄erence between natural out-
put and e¢ cient output decreases, i.e. the natural output tends to the e¢ cient
output. The reason is quite intuitive: the smaller is the population of unionized
￿rms, the smaller is the importance of real wage rigidity in the economy and
both the technology and reservation wage shocks become less and less relevant.
2.10 The Reduced Dynamic System
We assume that ￿rms choose Ph
t (j) in a staggered price setting ￿ la Calvo-Yun
[9]. As shown in Appendix A6, the solution of the ￿rm￿ s problem in the case of

















￿+￿(1￿￿) and   is the probability with which ￿rms reset
prices. Since aggregate in￿ ation is ￿t = q￿w
t + (1 ￿ q)￿u
t ; and considering the
welfare relevant output gap, given by the di⁄erence between actual and e¢ cient
output xt = yt ￿ y
Eff
t , the Phillips curve for the aggregate equation can be
written as,
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿a
1
￿
xt ￿ ￿a￿at + ￿a￿^ "
w
t (39)
where we have considered that in log-linear terms equation (15) implies that
wr
t = ^ "
w
t and where ￿ =
￿(1￿q)
￿(1￿￿)+￿q: From equation (39) is quite clear that, for
a central bank, achieving xt = 0 does not imply obtaining ￿t = 0: We therefore
have:
Result 1. In a two sector labor market economy, because of the presence of
unions, the ￿ divine coincidence￿does not hold, i.e., stabilizing in￿ation is not
equivalent to stabilizing the welfare relevant output gap. A negative (positive)
productivity shock has a positive (negative) e⁄ect on in￿ation, while a cost push
shock has an e⁄ect on in￿ation of the same size but with the opposite sign.
This result depends on the existence of a real distortion in the economy,
beside the one induced by monopolistic competition, and the nominal distor-
tion caused by ￿rms￿staggered price setting. When a productivity shock hits
13the economy, e¢ cient output, given by equation (25), increases by the same
amount. Natural output instead (i.e., the level of output that would prevail
in a ￿ exible price equilibrium) increases more than proportionally so that the
di⁄erence between e¢ cient output and natural output decreases. This is due to
the fact that in a unionized sector, following a productivity shock, real wages
remain constant and therefore do not o⁄set the e⁄ects of the shock on real
marginal cost. Therefore, the natural level of output di⁄ers from the e¢ cient
level and this di⁄erence is not constant. As it is evident from equation (40), if
the Central Bank stabilizes output around the e¢ cient level, in￿ ation will be
completely vulnerable to productivity and cost-push shocks; in other words,the
output gap is no longer a su¢ cient statistics for the e⁄ect of real activity on
in￿ ation.
Given (37), we immediately observe that the response of in￿ ation to tech-
nology and exogenous wage shocks decreases as the fraction of walrasian ￿rms
in the market increases. We can therefore state,
Result 2. The response of in￿ation to a negative productivity shock and to
a positive reservation wage shock decreases as the number q of walrasian ￿rms
increases.
Another interesting aspect of this model is that we are able to express the
Phillips curve in its more traditional form, i.e. in terms of unemployment. Let
Ut = 1 ￿ Nt be the rate of unemployment. From the log-linearization of the
aggregate production function and from equations (25), (36) and (39) we obtain




￿ (1 ￿ q)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿q
at + ￿a
￿ (1 ￿ q)




where ￿ = N
1￿N: The relationship between unemployment and the output gap
allows us to consider, indi⁄erently, the output gap and the unemployment rate
as policy objectives for the central bank.
In order to obtain the IS curve we start by log-linearizing15 the Euler equa-
tion (5) around the steady state. Considering the optimal subsidy setting, which
implies
￿N(N)N
￿(N) = ￿￿; the resource constraint (20), the aggregate production
function and the de￿nition of the welfare relevant output gap, we obtain,
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ (^ rt ￿ Et f￿t+1g ￿ ^ re
t): (41)
The interest rate is de￿ned as ^ rt = rt￿ %; where rt = lnRt and % = ￿ln￿
is the steady state interest rate; ^ re
t is the interest rate supporting the e¢ cient
15In order to loglinearize ￿(Nt)1￿￿ we ￿rst log-linearize the term Nt obtaining
￿[N (1 + nt)]1￿￿ :Applying a ￿rst order Taylor expansion, we obtain
￿[N (1 + nt)]1￿￿ = ￿(N)1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(N)￿￿ ￿N (N)Nnt
14equilibrium and is given by:
^ re






= ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿a)at: (42)




￿￿ (1 ￿ q)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿q




t ￿ ￿[(1 ￿ ￿a)at ￿ (1 ￿ ￿w)^ "
w
t ] (43)
Suppose that the economy is hit at the same time by a 1 standard deviation
technology shock and by a 1 standard deviation reservation wage shock. If
the persistence of former is greater (lower) than the persistence of the latter,
then, the natural rate of output is greater (lower) than the e¢ cient one. When
the shocks have the same persistence the natural and the e¢ cient interest rate
coincide. Note that, the di⁄erence between the natural and the e¢ cient rate of
interest is decreasing in the number of walrasian ￿rms and, in particular, for
q = 1; the endogenous trade-o⁄ cancels out and the natural rate of interest is
equal to the e¢ cient interest rate.
3 Monetary Policy
In Appendix A7 we show that also for the non-separable preferences assumed in
our framework, consumers￿utility can be approximated up to the second order



























where ~ Ut+k = Ut+k ￿ ￿ Ut+k is the deviation of consumers￿utility from the level
achievable in the e¢ cient equilibrium, and ￿ is the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods, which are used as inputs in the ￿nal good sectors.
Notice that the relative weights assigned to in￿ ation and to the output gap are
linked to the structural parameters re￿ ecting preferences and technology.
If the Central Bank cannot credibly commit in advance to a future policy
action or a sequence of future policy actions, then the optimal monetary policy
is discretionary, in the sense that the policy makers choose in each period the
value to assign to the policy instrument, that here we assume to be the short-
term nominal interest rate ^ rt. In order to do so, the Central Bank maximizes
the welfare-based loss function (44), subject to the economy￿ s Phillips curve
(39) and to the IS curve, (41), taking all expectations as given.





16The equation of the natural interest rate is obtained combining (42), (36) and the IS (of
the ￿exible price equilibrium) as in Woodford [52].
15Substituting into (39), iterating forward, and considering the law of motion of




















where ￿ = 1+￿a
￿￿
￿2: Notice that we can express current in￿ ation as a function of
the relevant shocks at and ^ "
w
t . A positive productivity shock requires a decrease
in in￿ ation and a positive cost push shock requires an increase in in￿ ation.
Using (46), (47) and the de￿nition of the e¢ cient interest rate (42) we have:
Et￿t+1 = ￿w￿t +
(￿a ￿ ￿w)





Expected in￿ ation can be written as a function of actual in￿ ation and of the
e¢ cient rate of interest.17
Given equation (39) and (46) we can write the expression of the output gap










The optimal level of in￿ ation can be implemented by the Central Bank by
setting the nominal interest rate. The interest rate rule can be obtained by


































We can therefore state
Result 3. Under discretion an optimal monetary policy requires a decrease
in the nominal interest rate following a positive productivity shock and an in-
crease in the nominal interest rate following a positive reservation wage shock.
The response of the nominal interest rate to both shocks decreases as the fraction
of walrasian ￿rms q increases.
Equations (46) and (49) can also be rewritten in terms of standard devia-
tions, which allows us to derive the output-gap in￿ ation volatility frontier. Since
17This result holds only when we consider that the economy is contemporary hit by the two
shocks. When considering only one shock it holds that as in Clarida et al. expexted in￿ation
depends only on actual in￿ation, i.e. Et￿t+1 = ￿￿t:
16by assumption both shocks are iid. and therefore ￿aw = 0; we can express the
volatility of in￿ ation and the volatility of the output gap as a function of the
























Notice that, as q ￿! 1 then ￿ ￿
￿(1￿q)
￿(1￿￿)+￿q = 0 and therefore ￿x = ￿￿ = 0:
When instead q ￿! 0; then ￿ = ￿
￿(1￿￿)+￿ and both ￿x and ￿￿ reach their
maximum possible values.
Let us now turn to the instrument rule that implements the optimal mone-
tary policy. We consider the case in which the economy is hit only by a single
technology shock, this means that we assume that ￿w = 0; i.e. the reservation
wage is always equal to its steady state (wr
t = 0). In this case from equation
(46), (47) and the equation of the IS curve we obtain:
^ r￿












Analogously, when the economy is hit by a single reservation shock, then the
instrument rule becomes:
^ r￿












We can now state:
Result 4. Optimal monetary policy under discretion requires a more than
proportional increase in the nominal interest rate following an increase in the
expected rate of in￿ation. An increase in the fraction of walrasian ￿rms does not
a⁄ect the response of the nominal interest rate to expected in￿ation but a⁄ects
the response of the nominal interest rate to its e¢ cient level.
Also in our model therefore, as in the standard New Keynesian model, op-
timality requires that the Central Bank respond to increasing in￿ ationary ex-
pectations by raising nominal interest rates more than proportionally. In other
words, also in a dualistic economy where part of the labor market is unionized,
the Taylor principle applies. The optimal response of the nominal interest rate
to an increase in the e¢ cient rate of interest, instead, is di⁄erent from the one
that is usually obtained in the ￿ standard￿DSGE New Keynesian model. While
the ratio between walrasian and unionized ￿rms is crucial in determining the
e⁄ect of technology and cost-push shocks on in￿ ation, it does not a⁄ect the
amount by which the interest rate must be raised in response to a unit increase
17in expected in￿ ation. In other words, the extent of real wage rigidity in the
economy does not a⁄ect the response coe¢ cient to expected in￿ ation.
In order to study analycally the unemployment and the real wage volatility
we derive an expression for unemployment and real wage standard deviation.
In particular, log-linearizing the demand for labor (13) in both sectors, we have












Since the aggregate wage is given by the weighted sum of wages in the two
sectors, it can be expressed as:
wt = qmcw








and given equations (30), (31), (33) and (34), we obtain
wt = xt ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)at + ￿^ "
w
t


















Moreover given the relationship between the output gap and unemployment,
i.e., xt = ￿￿










Equation (55) and (56) imply that the standard deviation of real wage and















@q > 0 (in fact ￿￿￿a
￿(￿￿￿￿a) ￿ 1 < 0) and @￿u
@q < 0; and therefore
@(￿u￿￿w)
@q < 0: We can therefore state
Result 6. Under an optimal discretionary policy and in response to a pro-
ductivity shock, the di⁄erence between unemployment volatiliy and real wage
volatility decreases as the number of walrasian ￿rms increases.
184 Calibration
Since we are interested in the impact of the degree of unionization in the labor
market on monetary policy, we calibrate the model under di⁄erent values of
the parameter q which represents the fraction of walrasian ￿rms in the market.
We follow closely the calibration of Zanetti [54], who studies, with a similar
framework,18 the response of monetary policy to technology shocks19. However,
while Zanetti considers capital accumulation and assumes that the central bank
follows a Taylor rule as the one estimated for Europe by Smets and Wouters,
[53] our simpler framework allows us to study optimal monetary policy. Since
we introduce a dual labor market, we are also able to compare economies with
di⁄erent degree of unionization.
The model is calibrated on quarterly frequencies. For the parameters de-
scribing preferences, we set the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at ￿ = 2:
The output elasticity of labor, ￿ = 0:72; is based on the estimate of Christo⁄el
et al. [14]. The discount factor ￿; the Calvo parameter ’; and the elasticity of
substitution among intermediate goods ￿; are set at values commonly found in
the literature. In particular we set ￿ = 0:99; ’ = 0:75; which implies an average
price duration of one year, and ￿nally ￿ = 6; which is consistent with a 10%
markup in the steady state. The persistence of the technology shock ￿a is set
as in Zanetti [54] i.e. ￿a = 0:8476: As discussed in Zanetti [54] N = 0:61:
The exercise we perform in this section is to ￿rst consider the impulse re-
sponse functions (IRFs henceforth) under a Taylor rule similar to the one con-
sidered by Zanetti [54], and then compare it with the IRFs obtained under the
optimal monetary policy. In the ￿rst case the Central Bank is assumed to follow
the following Taylor-type monetary policy rule:
^ rt = ￿r^ rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿r)[￿￿￿t￿1 + ￿xxt￿1] (59)
As in Smets and Wouters [53], the degree of interest rate smoothing is set
at ￿r = 0:9; the response of the nominal interest rate to in￿ ation is set at
￿￿ = 1:658 and the response to output at ￿x = 0:148:20 We ￿rst analyze an
economy where the labor market is fully unionized, i.e q = 0; and study the IRFs
to a one standard deviation productivity shock, under the Taylor type rule (59)
and under the optimal monetary policy.21 Then we repeat our simulation with
an economy in which the percentage of ￿rms belonging to a unionized labor
market is low, i.e. q = 0:85:
In ￿gure 1 we plot the response of the nominal interest rate, employment,
in￿ ation, real interest rate, output and output gap to a one unit standard de-
viation technology shock under the Taylor rule (59), with q = 0 (dotted line)
18He consider a DSGE NK model with phisycal and human capital accumulation, where all
￿rms are unionized.
19Zanetti ([54]) studies also the response of the economy to monetary policy shock.
20As in Zanetti,[54] who follows the suggestion of Carlstrom and Fuerst [10], we employ
lagged values for output and in￿ation because it can be considered consistent with the infor-
mation set of the Central Bank at time t.
21Assuming that q = 0 labor market is completely unionized as in Zanetti [54].
19and with q = 0:85 (continuous line): Under the ￿rst assumption, which implies
full unionization, our simple model behaves, from a qualitative point of view,
like the model proposed by Zanetti [54]. This suggests that adding physical
and human capital accumulation does not change the dynamics of the model.
When unions have a small weight in the economy and most of the labor market
is competitive, i.e. the case where q = 0:85; the response of the main economic
variables to productivity shocks is smaller and shocks are less persistent.
In ￿gure 2 we consider the impulse response functions of the same variables
under the optimal rule. We ￿nd that the behavior of the nominal interest rate,
in￿ ation, real interest rate and output gap is qualitatively similar to the one
found under the Taylor rule (59). An optimal policy, however, implies that
the response of these variables to a productivity shock is much larger when
q = 0 than in the case where q = 0:85: The behavior of the nominal and real
interest rates under an optimal rule, indicates that monetary policy must be
much more accomodating when unions play a large role. Di⁄erently from the
case where the central bank follows a Taylor rule, after a positive technology
shock employment increases in both the unionized and competitive cases. This
can be explained by the fact that, under the optimal rule, monetary policy is
much more accomodating than under the Taylor rule (59) and this allows a
larger increase output.
5 Conclusions
We have considered in this paper a DSGE New Keynesian model where labor is
indivisible and where there are, at the same time, two types of labor markets:
one where wages are set competitively and one where wages are the result of the
bargaining between ￿rms and monopoly unions. We found that, with respect to
the standard DSGE-NK framework, our model gives a more satisfactory descrip-
tion of the reality of modern industrialized economies, since it is able to account
for the existence of signi￿cant trade-o⁄s between stabilizing in￿ ation and sta-
bilizing unemployment, in response to technology and exogenous wage shocks.
Because of real wage rigidity which is induced by the presence of unions, an
optimizing central bank must respond to negative (positive) technology shocks
by increasing (decreasing) the interest rate and, similarly, must respond with
an interest rate increase to exogenous increases in unions￿reservation wage.
The e⁄ect of these shocks on in￿ ation and the necessary interest rate move-
ments set by an optimizing central bank depend on the size of the walrasian
sector relative to the unionized sector. If a large part of wages are set in a
competititve market, technology and cost-push shocks will have little e⁄ect on
in￿ ation and will induce small interest rate movements, while an economy where
large part of wages are set in unionized markets will experience larger in￿ ation
and interest rate movements. If we consider however an optimal instrument rule
where the central bank reacts to expected in￿ ation, the response of the nom-
inal interest rate to an increase in expected in￿ ation is not in￿ uenced by the
dualistic structure of the labor market. The model is also capable of accounting
20for the greater volatility of unemployment relative to the wage volatility that is
usually found in the data.
Even though, for the sake of simplicity, we concentrate on a rigid dualistic
structure of the labor market and we abstract from other market imperfections
like search and matching and ￿ring costs we are able to single out, with this
model, some of the challenges provided to monetary policy by di⁄erent institu-
tional settings in the labor market. The model, in particular, captures a relevant
structural change in the US and UK before and after 1979 and its consequences
for monetary policy. At the same time it single out an important di⁄erence
between Anglo-Saxon economies and continental Europe providing, therefore,
a useful benchmark to evaluate and compare the monetary policies enacted by
the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB.
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24Appendix
A1 Derivation of the Representative Agent￿ s Utility Function
Let us ￿rst consider the problem of an agent that supplies his labor to a
￿rm in the walrasian sector, i.e. to a ￿rm that faces a competitive labor market
where ￿rms and workers act as a price taker. We assume that households enter
employment lotteries, i.e. sign with a ￿rm a contract that commits them to work
a ￿xed number of hours, that we normalize to one, with probability Nw
t : Since
all households are identical, they will all choose the same contract, i.e. the same
Nw
t : However, although households are ex-ante identical, they will di⁄er ex-post
depending on the outcome of the lottery: a fraction Nw
t of the continuum of
households will work and the rest 1 ￿ Nw
t will remain unemployed. Lottery
outcomes are independent over time. Before the lottery draw, the expected















0;t is the consumption level of employed individuals. We denote by ￿ (￿)
the utility of leisure. Since the utility of leisure of employed individuals ￿ (0)
and the utility of leisure of unemployed individuals ￿ (1) are positive constants,
we assume ￿ (0) = ￿0 and ￿ (1) = ￿1: As in King and Rebelo22 [29], we assume
￿0 < ￿1:
Since they face a probability 1 ￿ Nw
t of not working at all, workers will try
to acquire insurance against the risk of remaining unemployed. We assume that
asset markets are complete, so that employed and unemployed individuals are
able to achieve perfect risk sharing, equating the marginal utility of consuption
accross states.
Let us now consider the case of a household that works in a unionized
labor market. The unionized sector is populated by decentralized trade unions,
so that each intermediate goods-producing ￿rm negotiate with a single union
i 2 (0;1); which is too small to in￿ uence the outcome of the market. Unions
negotiate the wage on behalf of their members. Once the wage rate is de￿ned,
￿rms chose the amount of labor that maximize their pro￿ts. Similarly to what
happens in the competitive case, labor is indivisible and workers participate
to employment lotteries. As in the previous case, therefore, before the lottery
draw, the expected intratemporal utility function of workers, who happens to















0;t is the consumption level of employed individuals. Again, we assume
￿ (0) = ￿0 and ￿ (1) = ￿1:
22This depends on the fact that the utility of leisure ￿(1 ￿ Nt) as usual, is an increasing
function of the time spend in leisure. Given that the time spend in leisure is greater for
unemployed agent than for employed agent this means that ￿ (1) > ￿ (0):
25Since they face a positive probability of being unemployed, risk averse work-
ers will try to obtain insurance against the risk of being unemployed; access to
complete asset markets will allow individuals to achieve perfect risk sharing. It
is important to observe that, beside the risk of remaining unemployed, workers
in this model face also another type of uncertainty since they do not know,
a priori, whether they will participate to a competitive labor market or to a
unionized one. We assume that, through complete asset markets, agents can
also acquire insurance against the income ￿ uctuations implied by this type of
uncertainty. Recalling that q is the probability of belonging to the walrasian
sector and 1 ￿ q is the probability of belonging to the unionized sector, before
the lotteries are drawn and before learning in what sector they will happen to

























































0;t = C0;t and Cu
1;t = Cw
1;t = C1;t
The average consumption level can be then rewritten as:
Ct = [qNw
t + (1 ￿ q)Nu
t ]C0;t + [q(1 ￿ Nw
t ) + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ Nu
t )]C1;t (A1.5)
the ￿rst two equations of the perfect risk sharing conditions can also be rewritten


















Substituting (A1.7) in (A1.5) and solving for C0;t
Ct = [qNw







+ [q(1 ￿ Nw
t ) + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ Nu
t )]C1;t
(A1.8)











+ [q(1 ￿ Nw
t ) + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ Nu
t )]
(A1.9)











+ [q(1 ￿ Nw




















+ [q(1 ￿ Nw














+ [q(1 ￿ Nw

















+ [q(1 ￿ Nw




de￿ning phi as...we can write the agents￿intertemporal utility function as equa-
tion (6) in the text.
A2 Intertemporal Allocation
Given the representative agent utility function (num) in the text, the equation of








and the budget constraint,
which can be rewritten as follows
Pu;tCu;t+Pw;tCw;t+EtDt;t+1Bt+1 ￿ Wu;tNu;t+Ww;tNw;t+Bt+￿t￿Tt (A2.1)














































and substituting in (A2.2) and (A2.3) we obtain:
Pw;tCw;t = qPtCt (A2.6)
and
Pu;tCu;t = (1 ￿ q)PtCt (A2.7)
Summing (A2.7) and (A2.6) it is easy to verify that:
PtCt = Pu;tCu;t + Pw;tCw;t (A2.8)
Finally, combining (A2.2), (A2.3) and (A2.4) we ￿nd the consuption euler equa-
tion in the text.
A3 Derivation of the CPI
For a given consumption index Ch (h 2 w;u) let Pw be the price of the

























￿ dj = ￿pw(j)￿1Cw(j)￿ 1
￿ (A3.1)







￿ = 1 (A3.2)








28We can now write













































￿￿1pw(j)1￿￿dj = 1 (A3.6)











































The consumption based price index solves the problem of minimizing qCw;t +
(1 ￿ q)C subject to
Ct =
1






























29A4 The Ramsey Problem
We consider a social planner which maximizes the representative household















































Nt = ￿￿: (A4.4)
In order to ￿nd an equation for the e¢ cient output we ￿rst log-linearizing the
previous equation around the steady state as follows,
[￿N (N) + ￿NN (N)Nnt]N (1 + nt) = ￿￿(￿(N) + ￿N (N)Nnt) (A4.5)
which can be rewritten as
￿N (N)N +￿N (N)Nnt+￿NN (N)N2nt = ￿￿(￿(N) + ￿N (N)Nnt) (A4.6)
considering the steady state equation ￿N (N)Nt = ￿￿￿(N) and collecting












nt = 0 (A4.7)










6= 0 we require,
nt = 0 (A4.8)
30and then from the aggregate production function we obtain equation (25) in the
text.
A5 Derivation of the Flexible Price Equilibrium Output in the Wal-
rasian Sector








￿Nw (Nt) = q￿N (Nt): (A5.2)
At the steady state we have,















































































































































































(1 ￿ q) (A5.8)























































(1 ￿ q) = ￿NN (N)q (1 ￿ q) (A5.10)
since the optimal subsidy is set such that in steady state Nw = Nu = N: Then
log-linearizing (A5.1) we obtain,
￿










MC (1 + mcw
t )
￿






which can be rewritten as:











MC (1 + mcw
t )
￿
￿(N) + q￿N (N)Nnw
t




Considering now that in steady state the optimal subsidy is set in such a way
that
￿N(N)








￿ ; then solving for
mcw
















32which the equation of real marginal costs in the text.
A6 Derivation of the Phillips Curve
Following Calvo ([9]), we assume that each ￿rm of each sector (may reset its
price with probability 1 ￿ ’ each period, indipendently from the time elapsed
since the last adjustment. This means that each period a measure 1￿’ of ￿rms
reset their price, while a fraction ’ of them keep their price unchanged. The
law of motion of the aggregate price is given by:
lnPh
t = ’lnPh













t denotes the (log) price set by a ￿rm i adjusting its price in period
t: Under Calvo price-setting structure pt+k (i) = p￿
t with probability ’k for
k = 0;1;2;:::; hence ￿rms have to be forward-looking.
Given that the individual ￿rm technology is characterized by decreasing
return to scale, the optimal price setting rule should take into account that
marginal cost is no longer common across ￿rms. In particular, in the neigh-
borhood of the zero in￿ ation steady state, we have the following price-setting
rule:
lnP￿h











t;t+k is the log-linearized nominal marginal cost in period t+k of a ￿rm
which last set its price in period t: Considering the equation of real marginal
cost and the one of the aggregate production function,
MCh

























































33Considering that all ￿rms resetting prices in period t will choose the same price
P
+
t we can rewrite equation (A6.3) as,
lnP￿h
t (i) ￿ lnPh




























substituting equation (A6.6) which can be rewritten as
lnP￿h
t (i) ￿ lnPh










































as in the text.
34A8 The Welfare-Based Loss Function
A second-order Taylor expansion of the period utility around the e¢ cient equi-
librium yields,
Ut = ￿ Ut + ￿ U ￿ C;t ￿ Ct ~ Ct +
1
2
￿ U ￿ C ￿ C;t ￿ C2
t ~ C2
t + ￿ U ￿ N;t ￿ Nt ~ Nt +
1
2
￿ U ￿ N ￿ N;t ￿ N2
t ~ N2
t +










denotes log-deviations from the e¢ cient equi-
librium and ￿ Xt denotes the value of the variable under e¢ cient equilibrium.






Considering the ￿ exible prices economy resource constraint,
Ut = ￿ Ut + ￿ U￿ Y ;t ￿ Yt ~ Yt +
1
2
￿ U￿ Y ￿ Y ;t ￿ Y 2
t ~ Y 2
t + ￿ U ￿ N;t ￿ Nt ~ Nt +
1
2
￿ U ￿ N ￿ N;t ￿ N2
t ~ N2
t +











￿ U ￿ N;t ￿ Nt
￿ U ￿ Y ;t ￿ Yt
~ Nt + 1
2
￿ U ￿ Y ￿ Y ;t
￿ U ￿ Y ;t




￿ U ￿ N ￿ N;t ￿ N
2
t
￿ U ￿ Y ;t ￿ Yt
~ N2
t +
￿ U ￿ Y ￿ N;t ￿ Nt
￿ U ￿ Y ;t









￿ U ￿ Y ￿ N;t ￿ Nt
￿ U ￿ Y ;t =
￿ ￿ N;t( ￿ Nt) ￿ Nt
￿( ￿ Nt) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿; we have,





~ Yt ￿ ￿ ~ Nt ￿ ￿
2 ~ Y 2
t + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿N( ￿ Nt)
￿( ￿ Nt)





















It can be shown that
￿NN;t( ￿ Nt)












~ Yt ￿ ￿ ~ Nt ￿ ￿
2 ~ Y 2
t + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿N( ￿ Nt)
￿( ￿ Nt)























Ut = ￿ Ut+￿ U￿ Y ;t ￿ Yt
￿





















We now take a ￿rst-order expansion of the term ￿ U￿ Y ;t ￿ Yt around the steady state.
￿ U￿ Y ;t ￿ Yt = UY
￿





















￿ ￿ Nt =
￿N (N)
￿(N)




















































given that ￿ nt = 0; and that
￿N(N)N
￿(N) = ￿￿; substituting into the Welfare func-
tion,
Ut = ￿ Ut+UY (1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ yt)
￿ ~ Yt ￿ ￿ ~ Nt ￿ ￿
2 ~ Y 2















Given the aggregate production function and that the log-deviations of the price
dispersion index dt = ~ Yt ￿ ￿ ~ Nt are of second-order, and that:
~ Y 2
t = ￿2 ~ N2
t nt￿ ~ Nt = nt ~ Yt yt￿ ~ Nt = yt ~ Yt ~ Yt￿ ~ Nt = ~ Y 2
t
considering only terms up to the second-order we have:
Ut = ￿ Ut + UY
￿ ~ Yt ￿ ~ Nt ￿ ￿
2 ~ Y 2















































As proven by Gal￿ and Monacelli [24], the log-index of the relative-price distor-























proof Gal￿ and Monacelli [24].












where ￿ = (1 ￿  )(1 ￿  ￿)= :
36Finally, denoting the output gap ~ Yt as in the standard way xt; the Welfare-



























37Figure 1: IRFs to a 1 unit standard deviation productivity shock under the EU
estimated Taylor rule.
Figure 2: IRFs to a 1 unit standard deviation productivity shock under the
optimal monetary policy
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